This paper explores the role of liquidity risk in the pricing of corporate bonds.
Introduction
Corporate bond yield spreads are far wider than is justified by historical default losses, which poses a puzzle to academic researchers. Recently, several explanations for this 'credit spread puzzle' have been explored, such as tax effects and market risk premia (see Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001) and the literature review in section 2). We contribute to this literature by studying in detail the pricing of liquidity risk in corporate bonds. It is well known by now that liquidity varies across corporate bonds, and several studies have documented a cross-sectional relation between the credit spread level and liquidity proxies, such as amount issued and bond age. Little is known however about the time variation in corporate bond liquidity and risk premia associated with changes in liquidity over time. In this paper we provide empirical evidence that corporate bonds are exposed to systematic liquidity shocks. In addition, we estimate the associated liquidity risk premia and show that these premia help to explain the credit spread puzzle.
Recent studies on equity market liquidity have shown that shocks to the liquidity of individual stocks contain a common component and that the (systematic) risk associated with this common component is priced in the cross-section of expected equity returns. In this paper we extend the literature on asset pricing and liquidity risk to corporate bonds. Compared to equity market data, corporate bond data have some advantages in testing the role of liquidity in asset pricing. Returns on corporate bonds are correlated with both the returns on the treasury bond market, and with returns on the stock market. Corporate bonds are thus a hybrid of default-free bonds and the firm's stock (Kwan, 1996) , and we can expect them to be exposed to liquidity shocks in both stock and bond markets. Another advantage of corporate bond data is that the corporate bond yield, corrected for the expected loss, gives quite an accurate measure of the expected return on the bond (Campello, Chen, and Zhang, 2004) . This is important given the problems associated with estimating expected returns using realized returns that plague the equity pricing literature.
We consider two types of liquidity risk, one originating from the equity market and one from the treasury bond market. To obtain a measure for equity market liquidity, we use the methodology proposed by Amihud (2002) . His ILLIQ measure captures the price impact of trade, by relating volume to the size of absolute returns. For the treasury market, we use monthly changes in the bid-ask spread of long-term US treasury bonds to measure liquidity risk. We use liquidity risk measures for both the equity market and the treasury market because this allows us to analyze to what extent liquidity shocks in these markets spill over to the corporate bond market. The empirical results of Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) suggest that corporate bond prices are to some extent driven by 'local' liquidity shocks. Our results show that liquidity risk in equity and treasury market impacts corporate bond prices. We also find that the premium on liquidity risk in the corporate bond market is similar to existing estimates of the liquidity risk premium for the equity market.
Our analysis is based on a linear multifactor asset pricing model, in which expected corporate bond returns are explained from their exposure to market risk and liquidity risk factors. Similar to Elton et al. (2001) and Campello, Chen and Zhang (2004) , expected corporate bond returns are estimated from credit spread and default and recovery rate data. We include two market risk factors: the return on an equity index, and the change in the option-implied equity index volatility. For measuring the corporate bond yields, we focus on portfolios that are constructed according to maturity and credit rating. We estimate this model using US corporate bond price data for a 1993-2002 sample period. We also perform a similar analysis for a recent sample of European bond data.
Our main empirical findings are as follows. First, expected bond returns (in excess of government bond returns) are larger for lower-rated firms, and range from 0.52% per annum for AAA-rated bonds to 2.56% for CCC-rated bonds. These estimates are in line with existing results. Second, using time-series regressions where we control for market risk using the stock market index return and the change in the implied equity index volatility, we provide evidence that corporate bond returns are positively related to changes in the equity and bond market liquidity measures. Importantly, the liquidity exposure is larger for lower-rated bonds. The cross-sectional regression of expected corporate bond returns on market and liquidity beta's renders significant premia on liquidity risk. The liquidity risk premia are economically important, as their contribution to the level of expected corporate bond returns is of similar size as the market risk premium. For long-maturity investment grade bonds, we estimate liquidity premia around 0.6% in terms of annual expected returns. For speculative grade bonds, the average liquidity premium is around 1.5% per annum. These results are robust to (i) the inclusion of a tax effect (Elton et al. (2001) ), (ii) using swap rates instead of treasury rates to proxy for default-free rates, (iii) using an intraday price-impact measure to capture equity market liquidity risk, and (iv) assuming different levels for the equity premium. We validate the results by replicating our analysis for the European corporate bond market. Similar to the US results, we find that European corporate bond returns have a significant exposure to liquidity risk, and that a liquidity risk premium helps to explain part of the credit spread puzzle.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section we discuss how our paper is related to the existing literature on the credit spread puzzle, and to studies on equity and bond market liquidity. We set out the factor pricing model, the empirical methodology and the construction of expected returns and the liquidity measures in section 3. The empirical findings for the US market are presented in section 4. Section 5 presents results for the European bond market. Section 6 offers some conclusions.
Related Literature
In this paper we propose liquidity as an additional risk factor in the determination of corporate bond returns. There is by now a fairly substantial literature that relates liquidity to asset pricing. The early papers in this field build on the idea that investors require an additional return on securities that are illiquid, in order to compensate for the transaction cost incurred when trading the assets, see for example Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) . Amihud (2002) shows evidence that equity returns are affected by both expected and unexpected liquidity. Hasbrouck (2006) finds mixed evidence that expected liquidity affects expected returns, while Acharya and Pedersen (2005) provide evidence that expected liquidity is an important determinant of expected returns in their model of liquidity and asset prices for US equities.
For the treasury bond market, Amihud and Mendelson (1991) find that less liquid treasury notes are cheaper than otherwise identical but more liquid treasury bills. This evidence is disputed, however, by Strebulaev (2002) , who compares matching notes series. Elton and Green (1998) find small effects of liquidity differences on bond prices. Krishnamurthy (2002) and Goldreich, Hanke and Nath (2003) document differences in yields due to the liquidity difference of on-the-run and off-the run bond issues.
One of the possible reasons why liquidity effects in the pricing of treasury bonds are relatively weak is that spreads are extremely narrow. Estimates in Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2005) and Fleming (2003) show that the bid-ask spread on the on-the-run 10 year Treasury note is typically around 2 or 3 basis points.
Bid-ask spreads in the corporate bond market are an order of magnitude higher than in the treasury market. In a recent study, Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2004) report that bid-ask spreads on investment grade corporate bonds are around 11 basis points for a typical institutional trade size. For below investment grade bonds, the spreads are wider and are around 15 basis points. These bid-ask spreads are smaller than the spreads typically estimated for equity trades. For example, Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001) report effective bid-ask spreads between 50 and 100 basis points for NYSE stocks. Several studies examine the effect of expected liquidity on credit spreads. Houweling, Mentink and Vorst (2003) and Perraudin and Taylor (2003) show that the cross-sectional variation in credit spreads is partly explained by proxies for individual bond liquidity. Microstructure theory suggests that the transitory cost plus the price impact of a trade is a good measure of an asset's liquidity. Using intra-day transaction data, Sadka (2006) shows that the price impact component, rather than the transitory cost component, is the priced liquidity risk factor for equities. With daily data, Amihud's (2002) ILLIQ measure seems to be a reasonable proxy for the price impact of trading. Hasbrouck (2006) shows that cross-sectionally, ILLIQ is positively correlated with transactions data based price impact estimates. We thus follow Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and construct an aggregate measure of equity market liquidity based on individual equities' ILLIQ measures. As a robustness check, we show that we obtain similar results using intraday price-impact estimates to construct the liquidity risk factor (using the TAQ based liquidity estimates from Hasbrouck (2006) ). Fleming (2003) compares several proxies for Treasury market liquidity, and concludes that the quoted spread is the best commonly available measure to track changes in Treasury bond liquidity.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on the credit spread puzzle. Elton, In sum, these articles find that taxes, a market risk premium and jump risk premia explain a reasonable part of the expected corporate bond returns and credit spreads, but explaining the full magnitudes remains difficult. The same conclusion is reached in recent work that compares spreads on credit default swaps (CDS) to corporate bond spreads (Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) and Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2004)).
These authors find that CDS spreads are much lower than corporate bond spreads, and they attribute the difference to tax and liquidity effects. Our paper complements this work by providing direct evidence that corporate bond prices contain a liquidity risk premium. In addition, the existing work mainly focuses on investment-grade bonds, while we include the entire rating spectrum in our analysis, and provide evidence that speculative-grade bonds also exhibit large excess returns. A final contribution to existing work on the credit spread puzzle is that we also study a sample of European bond data, and show that a credit spread puzzle exists for European corporate bonds as well. liquidity effects for credit default swaps, using the quote updating frequency to proxy for liquidity. Applying a term structure approach, they provide some evidence for a liquidity risk premium. Downing, Underwood, and Xing (2005) use corporate bond transaction data to construct price impact measures, and show that a portfolio that mimicks illiquidity is priced in the cross-section of bond returns. Our work differs from these papers in several dimensions. First, our liquidity risk factors represent systematic liquidity shocks in equity and government bond markets, which have been shown to carry a risk premium in these markets. Second, instead of using realized corporate bond returns, we use the credit spread level to construct expected bond returns. In section 3 we argue that this leads to more reliable estimates for expected returns. Finally, we assess the implications of our results for the credit spread puzzle.
Empirical Model and Data
Our empirical model follows the lines of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) , who estimate a linear model for equity returns with several factor mimicking returns, and shocks to a liquidity factor. Similarly, we assume a linear dependence of corporate bond returns on market risk factors and liquidity risk factors. For estimation, we employ a two-step procedure. In the first step, factor loadings and liquidity beta's are estimated from an unrestricted multivariate regression of the excess holding returns of corporate bond portfolio i on K F market risk factors and K L liquidity risk factors: represents a zero-expectation error term. In the second step, we run a cross-sectional regression of (estimates of) the expected excess returns on the estimated factor loadings:
The K L -dimensional vector with regression coefficients λ L represents the premia on liquidity risk in equity and government bond markets. Similarly, the K F -dimensional vector with regression coefficients λ F represents the market risk premia.
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In the next subsection, we describe how we obtain estimates for the expected excess returns in equation (2).
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Standard errors are calculated using Shanken's (1992) formula using the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated expected returns E[r i,t ].
The corporate bond yield data that we use is measured at index level, grouped by credit rating and maturity, and not at the individual firm level. The aggregation to the index level might remove some individual variation in exposures, but on the other hand will lead to much more reliable estimates of the beta's and hence less measurement error problems in the second stage regression (equation (2)). A drawback of the index-level data is that we cannot include expected liquidity in the model, because we don't have observations on corporate bond bid-ask spreads, turnover or other liquidity measures.
We include two market risk factors (K F = 2), the equity market index return and the change in the implied volatility of equity index options, and two liquidity risk factors 2 Notice that, as in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) , this model does not include the liquidity level as a separate determinant of expected returns. Liquidity is only present as a risk factor. 3 Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) use GMM for estimation. The main reason to use the two-step method in this paper, and not GMM, is that we do not use realized returns in the second step, but a credit spread-based estimate for expected returns.
(K L = 2), representing shocks to equity market and government bond market liquidity respectively.
We now turn to a description of the variables and data on corporate bond and equity returns, and the construction of the liquidity measures.
Constructing expected corporate bond returns
We focus on corporate bond data that are aggregated up to the rating and maturity For each index, we collect the yield-to-maturity (averaged across all issues in the index) and the average maturity of all issues. Our sample period runs from January 1993 until February 2002, and we use a monthly frequency for the data. 4 We construct a time series of credit spreads for each index by subtracting the appropriate government bond yield from the yield associated with the corporate bond index.
To construct estimates for expected corporate bond returns we adopt the following procedure. First, we approximate each corporate bond index by a discount bond that has the same duration as the corporate bond index.
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Next, we use the following ex-4 Before 1993, the speculative grade indices contain very few bond issues in some months. 5 In order to calculate the duration of the corporate bond index, we assume that all issues in the bond index have the same maturity and coupon. Driessen (2004) reports an average coupon rate of 7.6% for a similar sample period. Using this coupon rate and the reported average maturity of each index, the durations can readily be calculated. On average, this results in durations of about 4
years for the intermediate-maturity indices, 11 years for the long-maturity indices, and 6 years for the all-maturity indices.
pression to calculate the expected return on a corporate discount bond with maturity τ
In equation (3), r t,τ is the return on a corporate discount bond that matures at time t + τ , π D is the probability of default before time t + τ , l is the loss rate in case of default, Y g,t is the time-t government discount rate with maturity date t + τ , and S t is the τ -maturity credit spread. Expression (3) assumes that default losses are incurred at maturity. Next, we annualize the expected return in equation (3) and subtract the annual expected return on a government discount bond (obtained by setting the credit spread and default probability equal to zero in (3)). This gives us the annual expected corporate bond return in excess of the government bond return. Similar procedures for calculating expected corporate bond returns have been applied by Elton et al. (2001) and Campello, Chen and Zhang (2004).
We apply equation (3) to obtain empirical estimates of the expected excess corporate bond returns. First, we use S&P data on historical default rates to estimate the default probabilities π D . These data are based on a 1985-2003 sample period. Table 1 shows these cumulative default rates for several maturities. This table illustrates the well-known stylized fact that high-rated firms (AAA to A) have very low default rates.
For lower-rated firms, default risk quickly becomes more important. We use these data to estimate π D for each bond index duration τ . Since the durations of the bond indices are not integers, we interpolate between the appropriate annual cumulative default rates. As in Elton et al. (2001), we use historical loss rates reported in Altman and Kishmore (1998), which vary from 32% for AAA-rated firms to 62% for CCC-rated firms. Finally, in each month of our dataset we observe government bond yields and credit spreads, so that each month we can construct an estimate for the expected return using equation (3) . For each index, we take the time-series average of these expected return estimates to obtain an estimate for the unconditional expected return. Figure 1 contains the results of the procedure described above. First of all, figure 1 contains the average credit spread for each bond index. The graph shows that even high-rated bonds have credit spreads of at least 50 basis points, while speculative-grade bonds have credit spreads between 3% (BB) and 10% (CCC). Second, figure 1 contains the expected excess corporate bond returns (from equation (3)), and the expected loss in terms of returns, defined here as the difference between the credit spread and the expected excess return. The graph shows that the credit spread level tracks the shape of the expected loss across ratings, but there is clear evidence for a positive expected excess return, as indicated by the solid line in figure 1 . The expected return increases with the credit risk, and varies from about 0.5% per year for AAA-rated bonds to 2.56%
per year for CCC-rated bonds. Figure 1 also illustrates the credit spread puzzle: for investment grade bonds, actual default risk is extremely small relative to the observed credit spread. In addition, speculative-grade bonds also have high expected excess returns. As discussed earlier, this motivates our study of liquidity risk premia for corporate bonds. In the next section, we include this tax effect as a robustness check.
Finally, for estimating the market and liquidity factor exposures, we need monthly holding returns on the corporate bond portfolios. We follow Elton et al. (2001) in constructing the part of corporate bond holding returns that is driven by credit spread changes. We use the duration approximation to obtain a monthly time series of these returns, multiplying the (negative of the) bond index duration with the monthly change in the credit spread of each bond index. The time series of these 'returns' will be used later to examine whether credit spread changes are exposed to systematic market and liquidity shocks, by calculating market and liquidity-beta's. As in Elton et al. (2001) , this analysis is conservative in the sense that we do not incorporate any potential systematic variation in rating transitions or realized defaults.
Equity market data
We incorporate two market risk factors in our analysis. The choice of market factors is motivated by a theoretical firm value model. In the one-factor Merton (1974) model and subsequent extensions, the diffusive shocks in the firm values can be priced, and this effect is captured by including the equity index return as a risk factor. Note that in such a one-factor model the equity index volatility varies over time, but this effect is fully driven by changes in the firm values. This is the so-called leverage effect. In these models, it suffices to include a single factor that captures changes in the firm value. It may however be that the firm value volatility is stochastic and driven by a second factor.
In such a case, the equity index volatility will vary due to the leverage effect and due to the effect of the second factor, and corporate bond returns will have exposure to both factors. In particular, bond prices should decrease if firm value volatility increases. To capture the possible effect of the stochastic volatility factor, we include the change in the implied equity index volatility in our model. Including volatility is important for two reasons. First of all, changes in liquidity and volatility are often related, so that we need to control for volatility to estimate the effect of liquidity on prices. Second, several empirical studies on equity index options provide evidence that volatility risk is priced (Bakshi and Kapadia (2003)).
The excess return on the US equity market is constructed as the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks, as provided on Kenneth French's website. In addition, to capture changes in market volatility we use data on the VIX index, provided by CBOE on their website. The VIX is an estimate of the expected 30-day risk-neutral volatility, as implied by S&P 500 option prices. We find a substantial leverage effect for the US equity index: the correlation between equity index returns and the change in the volatility index equals -53%. We therefore orthogonalize the change in volatility with respect to the market index return by regressing the change in the VIX on the market return. The regression residuals represent leverage-corrected volatility changes. Hence, the volatility risk variable captures volatility risk in excess of the leverage effect.
Construction of liquidity measures
We now discuss the construction of liquidity measures for the equity and treasury bond markets. For the equity market, we follow Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and use
Amihud's illiquidity measure ILLIQ. A stock is defined to be liquid if large volumes can be traded without generating much price impact. Amihud (2002) suggests to estimate the price impact by the ratio of the absolute daily price change and the daily absolute trading volume, averaged over a number of days. This so-called ILLIQ measure for stock i in month t is estimated as follows
where D t denotes the number of trading days in month t, r The correlation of this liquidity risk measure with the monthly changes in the ILLIQ measure equals 40% over our sample period. Figure 2 depicts the ILLIQ and intraday price impact measures, and illustrates the strong positive relation between the two measures.
For the treasury bond market, we use data on the quoted bid-ask spread for long-maturity US treasury bonds. Fleming (2003) compares several liquidity proxies, such as trade size, quote size, the on-the-run/off-the-run spread, and the quoted bid-ask spread, and concludes that for government bonds the bid-ask spread is the most useful commonly available measure for assessing and tracking liquidity. In particular, the bidask spread is highly correlated with a more sophisticated price-impact measure (which is similar to the ILLIQ measure). Fleming (2001) 
We use the data for the longest bond maturity available, 10 years, since we mainly focus on intermediate-and long-maturity corporate bonds in our analysis. Figure 3 contains the time series of the bid-ask spread for 10-year government bonds, and, for comparison, the average credit spread across all rating categories and maturities. This graph provides some first evidence that liquidity shocks influence the level of credit spreads. In particular, the Russia/LTCM crisis leads to an increase in both the bidask spread and the credit spread, but a positive relationship seems to be present at other times as well. In the next section we will present more formal evidence of this relationship.
Empirical Results for US Bonds
This section contains the empirical results for US corporate bonds. First, we discuss the results for the benchmark specification in equations (1) and (2), after which we present several robustness checks. Finally, we compare our outcomes with results obtained in previous work on equity market liquidity.
Main Results
To obtain the exposure of bond returns to the risk factors, we regress the corporate bond returns, in excess of the government bond return, on the contemporaneous changes in our liquidity measures, the stock market index return and the monthly change in the volatility index using equation (1) . The results in table 3 show that corporate bonds have a significant exposure to all factors, except to the orthogonalized volatility index. That is, there is no evidence that volatility risk plays a role for corporate bond index returns once we incorporate liquidity factors, the market index return and the leverage effect. In the remainder of the analysis we therefore drop the volatility index from our regressions. We also estimated the exposure of excess corporate bond returns to default-free interest rate changes, but we found only very small and generally insignificant coefficients. Therefore, we also do not include interest rates as a factor in our further analysis. Table 4 presents the factor-beta's that are obtained if we leave out the volatility risk factor. The results show that corporate bonds have a strong and significant exposure to liquidity risk. All corporate bonds have a negative loading on the change in the equity market illiquidity, the ILLIQ measure. The negative signs imply that when the illiquidity of the equity market increases, corporate bond prices fall, and credit spreads increase. In other words, when liquidity is low investors bid lower prices for corporate bonds. This relationship is significant for 10 out of 11 portfolios at the 10% level, and for 9 out of 11 portfolios at the 5% level. In addition, the ILLIQ-beta is larger (more negative) for long-maturity bond portfolios and for lower-rated portfolios. To assess the economic impact of liquidity shocks in the equity market, we focus on a monthly shock in the ILLIQ measure of one standard deviation. We find that an increase in ILLIQ of one standard deviation implies a return on the A-rated long-maturity bond portfolio of 0.27%, which is substantial.
The exposure to liquidity shocks in the government bond market also turns out to be important. Again, all portfolios have a negative exposure to shocks in the bid-ask spread of government bonds. For 8 out of 11 portfolios this relationship is significant at the 10% level. A monthly one standard deviation shock in the bid-ask spread corresponds to a corporate bond return of 0.32% on the A-rated long-maturity bond portfolio, which is similar to the impact of the ILLIQ measure. Again, long-maturity and lower-rated bond portfolios have the strongest exposure to the liquidity measure. These low beta's can 7 Across all rating categories, the market-beta's reported by Elton et al. (2001) are somewhat larger than our estimates. Since we also have liquidity risk factors in our regressions, while Elton et al. include book-to-market and size factors, some differences between the market-beta's may be expected.
be explained by the fact that high-rated firms contain only a small amount of default risk, which makes these bonds relatively insensitive to systematic stock price changes.
Given that the monthly standard deviation of the equity index returns equals 4.36%, a one standard deviation shock to the equity index value corresponds to a return on the A-rated long-maturity bond portfolio of 0.38%. This shows that the economic impact of liquidity shocks is close to the impact of systematic equity price changes. As expected, low-rated firms do have a higher stock market exposure. For example, the Brated portfolio has a market-beta of 0.292. In total, the two liquidity measures and the S&P 500 return explain a considerable part of the variation in corporate bond returns.
Only for CCC-rated firms the R 2 is quite small. This is most likely due to the fact that the CCC-rated firms are more sensitive to firm-specific shocks. Across all portfolios however, the average R 2 is 42%. This is considerably higher than the R Table 5 reports the results of the cross-sectional expected return regressions from equation (2) . We first consider a regression where only the equity ILLIQ-beta's are included on the right-hand side (in addition to the market-beta's), but not the government bond BAS beta (regression I). The main result is that the estimate for the premium on changes in the ILLIQ measure is negative and significant. The negative sign implies that corporate bond portfolios with larger (i.e. more negative) ILLIQ-beta's have higher expected returns. In other words, investors that hold corporate bonds that have a high exposure to equity market liquidity shocks are compensated for this risk by earning a higher expected return. The equity premium is estimated at 2.04% per year, and is actually insignificant. Below, we analyze what happens if we allow for a larger equity risk premium. The cross-sectional R 2 is 92.2%, so that the ILLIQ-beta's, together with the equity market-beta's, explain most of the cross-sectional variation in expected corporate bond returns.
Next we estimate both the ILLIQ risk premium and the premium associated with changes in the bid-ask spread of government bonds (regression II). Given that both liquidity measures have similar beta-patterns (see tables 3 and 4), disentangling the two liquidity risk premia is difficult. Indeed, the correlation between the liquiditybeta's across corporate bond portfolios equals 74.7%. It is therefore not surprising that allowing for a risk premium on government bond liquidity leads to only a tiny increase in the cross-sectional R 2 , from 92.2% to 92.4%. Despite this large positive correlation between the beta's of the two liquidity measures, negative and significant estimates for both liquidity risk premia are obtained. The equity premium is estimated at 2.52% in this case, and is again insignificant. We also estimated a model with only the government bond BAS beta's and without the ILLIQ beta's. The estimated illiquidity risk premium (not reported) is somewhat larger than the one estimated in regression II, and the fit is almost the same as for the model with both beta's included.
Again, this can be understood from the high correlation between the government bond BAS beta's and the ILLIQ beta's.
Our results can be nicely summarized by graphing the direct estimates of expected returns and comparing those with the model-implied expected returns. Figure 4 shows these patterns using the results for regression II in table 5, and decomposes the premia on market risk and the two liquidity risk measures. The graph shows that market and liquidity risk premia both generate economically important contributions to the total expected return. For example, for the AA long-maturity index the total annualized liquidity premium equals 0.58% versus 1.47% per year for the CCC index. Even though our model generates considerable liquidity risk premia for most categories, the model still underestimates the level of expected returns for short-maturity, high-rated bonds.
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For all other bond indices the model describes expected returns quite accurately.
Robustness Checks
In this subsection we discuss several robustness checks to regressions I and II in table 5, and analyze whether the liquidity risk premia remain significant. As a first robustness check, we include a tax effect in our analysis. Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001) argue that corporate bond coupons are taxed at the state level, while government bond coupons are not. In addition, a tax refund is obtained in case of default losses.
This creates a spread between corporate and government bond yields. To analyze the potential impact of this tax effect, we follow the procedure described by Elton et al.
We use an effective state tax rate of 4.875%, as reported by Elton et al., and a coupon rate of 7.6% (based on Driessen (2005)), to calculate the before-tax expected return on corporate bonds, in excess of after-tax corporate bond returns. We then subtract this tax-generated difference from our direct estimates for the expected corporate bond returns from equation (3), and re-estimate the liquidity risk premia, again using crosssectional regressions. Table 5 shows that the liquidity risk premia are still negative after correcting for a tax effect. Even though the liquidity risk premia are not individually significant (due to the strong correlation between the two liquidity risk beta's), they are jointly significant. Figure 5 summarizes the implications for expected returns. The figure shows the fitted expected returns given the tax correction. The tax correction itself is largest for high-rated bonds. For these firms, the default probability is low and the main effect is the lower after-tax coupon rate. For low-rated firms with higher default probabilities, an opposing effect of taxes starts to play a role, due to the fact that default losses generate a tax refund. As a result, the total tax effect is essentially zero for CCC-rated bonds. In general, allowing for a tax effect leads to a fit that is better overall. The estimated liquidity risk premiums are slightly smaller than in the model without tax effects, but still significant. We would like to stress that the tax argument is not uncontroversial. For example, Amato and Remolona (2004) argue that, since state tax rates vary across states, it is not obvious what the average marginal tax rate for US investors is.
The second robustness check concerns the choice of default-free interest rates, used to calculate credit spreads. Instead of treasury bonds, practitioners often use swap rates to calculate credit spreads. A disadvantage of swap rates is that the floating leg is based on AA-rated Libor rates, which generates a spread with the 'true' default-free term structure even when neglecting counterparty default risk. On the other hand, the treasury bond market exhibits some particular liquidity effects, such as repo specialness, which do not play a direct role in the swap market. Feldhutter and Lando (2006) try to estimate the 'true' default-free term structure and find that this term structure lies between the treasury and swap curves, but is somewhat closer to the swap curve.
Using Datastream data on US swap rates, we construct credit spreads as the difference between corporate yields and swap rates, and calculate again (expected) excess corporate bond returns. Table 5 presents the results of the second-step regression, and shows that the liquidity risk premia remain negative and jointly significant. The ILLIQ liquidity risk premium is also significant individually. Relative to regression II, the ILLIQ premium becomes more negative while the risk premium associated with the treasury bond bid-ask spread becomes less negative. This can be understood from the first-step regression results (not reported), which show that the exposure of corporateswap spreads to the treasury market liquidity is smaller (in absolute value) compared to the results for corporate-treasury spreads. This is consistent with a flight-to-quality effect for the treasury market: in case of market turbulence and decreasing liquidity (higher bid-ask spreads), demand for treasury bonds increases. This pushes down treasury rates, thus increasing the corporate-treasury spread (and the swap-treasury spread), while the corporate-swap spread is less affected. Table 5 also shows that using swap rates leads to a higher cross-sectional R
2
. This is explained from the fact that the swap-treasury spread is largest for short maturities: on average, this spread equals about 36 basis points for 3-year swaps, and about 18 basis points for 10-year swaps.
Given that, based on treasury data, the largest mispricing occurred for short maturities (figure 4), using swap rates as benchmark rates provides a somewhat better fit as shown in figure 6 .
We also validate our results by using an alternative measure for equity market liquidity, the price impact measure based on intraday TAQ data constructed in Hasbrouck show that corporate bond returns have a negative exposure to this alternative equity market illiquidity measure, which is significant at the 5% level for 8 out of 11 portfolios.
Normalizing the price impact measure to have the same standard deviation of monthly changes as the ILLIQ measure, we find that the size of the exposures is similar or even larger than the ILLIQ exposures.
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Regression V in table 5 shows the results of the second-step cross-sectional regression. Both liquidity risk premia are negative and significant, while in this case the estimated equity premium is slightly negative, but not significantly so. In sum, we find very similar results when we use an alternative measure for equity market liquidity risk.
As a final robustness check, we do not estimate the equity market risk premium but instead consider several fixed levels for the equity premium. In each case, the chosen equity premium is multiplied with the equity market-beta to obtain the total contribution to the expected corporate bond return. We consider five values for the equity premium, ranging from 2% to 8% per year. Recently, Fama and French (2002) have argued that the historically observed average stock returns, which typically ranges from 5% to 8%, are likely to be upward biased estimates of the ex-ante equity premium.
Instead, using dividend yield information, they estimate the equity premium at about 4%. The estimates for the liquidity risk premia are somewhat sensitive to the choice for the equity market risk premium, but table 5 shows that only for high levels of the equity premium (6% and 8%), the estimated liquidity risk premia are only jointly significant, and not individually. (2003) and Sadka (2006) report an illiquidity risk premium between 5% and 7.5%. These numbers are much bigger than the estimates of AP, but notice that these papers do not take expected liquidity into account. Expected liquidity is important in the AP model: according to AP Table 1 , the highest liquidity portfolio has a average transaction cost of 0.25% and a turnover of 12 × 0.0325 = 40% per annum, which implies a 10 basis points expected annual trading cost. The lowest liquidity portfolio has 8.85% transaction cost and a turnover of 0.026 × 12 = 30% per annum, implying 2.75% annual expected trading costs.
Discussion of the results
A possible criticism on our results is that we do not include an expected liquidity factor in the model. We do not have any direct data on the expected liquidity of corporate bonds, but Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (EHP, 2004) provide some relevant transaction cost data for US corporate bonds. EHP report (in their Table 4 ) an average trading costs of 11 basis points for a 1 million dollar trade, which is the average trade size (EHP, Table 2 ), and an annual turnover of 83% (EHP, Table 2 ). These numbers are averages across all ratings. EHP show some cross-sectional regressions of transaction costs with dummies for BBB, BB/B and C rated bonds. For a 1 million dollar trade, the trading costs of low rated bonds are between 3 basis points and 5 basis points higher than for A or higher rated bonds. All in all, the average trading cost for C rated bonds is below 15 basis points. Multiplied by the turnover of 83% we find expected trading costs below 12 basis points per annum for the low ratings, and at most 9 basis points for the high ratings. The expected trading costs for corporate bonds are thus low compared to equity trading costs. These numbers seem unlikely to explain the pricing errors of our model, and are unlikely to significantly affect the estimates of the ILLIQ risk premium.
To summarize, the liquidity risk premium estimated for the corporate bond market seems in line with the estimates obtained in the equity market. An interesting extension of this paper would be to allow for priced jump risk in the model. As shown by Cremers, Driessen and Maenhout (2006) , priced jump risk has a strong effect on high-rated shortmaturity bonds and a relatively smaller effect on long-maturity bonds. As such, priced jump risk may help to explain expected corporate bond returns across ratings and maturities.
Results for European Corporate Bonds
In this section we perform another robustness check on the results presented above, by analyzing a sample of corporate bond indices from the countries in the Euro zone.
This market has emerged since the introduction of the Euro in 1999 and has grown substantially over the years. Our main interest is to analyze whether European corporate bond returns have an exposure to shocks in liquidity. Given the relatively short sample period, it will be difficult to precisely estimate the liquidity risk premium, but as we shall show, the main results of the US analysis also hold for the European data.
Return and Liquidity Measures
The construction of European (expected) corporate bond returns and liquidity measures is performed in the same way as for the US data. The only difference with the US analysis is that we do not have access to aggregate data on government bond liquidity.
We therefore focus on the measure for equity market liquidity.
The corporate bond data consist of Lehman Brothers Euro indices. For each rating category, we have data on indices that cover the entire maturity spectrum. Table 1 compares the default rates for Europe with the US rates at the 5-year horizon. It turns out that high-rated European firms have lower default rates, while low-rated European firms have higher default rates than US firms. Since we do not have information on loss rates across rating categories for European firms, we use the loss rates derived from US data. Figure 7 contains the resulting estimates for the expected European corporate bond returns across ratings. The graph shows first of all that average credit spreads vary from 29 basis points for AAA bonds to almost 19% for CCC bonds. After correcting for the expected loss, the expected return varies from 0.29% per annum for AAA to 4.26% per annum for BB. In contrast to the US results (figure 1), the expected excess return is not entirely monotonic in the rating level, which reflects the shorter sample we have for Europe. Unreported results show that the expected return estimates are significantly different from zero at the 5% level for all categories, except for the B and CCC categories, which are the exactly the ratings for which the nonmonotonic behavior occurs. Inspection of the credit spread time series reveals that the B and CCC credit spreads exhibit extremely large time series volatility, which may be partially due to the relatively low number of bond issues in the index. In contrast, the credit spreads of high rated bonds are quite stable over time. Overall, the expected European corporate bond returns are slightly lower than the US returns for high ratings, and slightly higher for low ratings. Despite these differences between the US and European estimates, these results clearly indicate that a similar credit spread puzzle exists for European bonds.
As before, we obtain an approximation of the time series of realized bond returns by multiplying the (negative of the) bond index duration with the monthly change in the credit spread of the index. The resulting time series of bond returns is used to estimate the exposure to market risk, volatility risk, and liquidity risk. As proxy for the market return, we use monthly returns (in Euros) on the S&P Europe 350 index. Volatility risk is captured using data on the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility Index (VSTOXX).
This index presents an estimate for the one-month ahead risk-neutral volatility of the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 index, obtained from prices of short-maturity options on this index.
We again use the ILLIQ measure to capture the liquidity risk of equity markets.
We use daily Datastream data on equity returns, market capitalization and volume of all stocks in the S&P Europe 350 index in order to estimate a monthly ILLIQ value for each stock. As before, we calculate the median across all stocks to obtain a monthly market-wide liquidity level. Figure 8 
Empirical Results
In a first step, we assess the exposure of corporate bonds to market, volatility, and liquidity risk by regressing corporate bond returns on the S&P 350 index return, the monthly change in the VSTOXX level, and the monthly change in the ILLIQ level.
The leverage effect for the European equity market is even larger than in the US: the correlation between equity index returns and the change in the VSTOXX equals -84%. We therefore again orthogonalize the change in the volatility with respect to the market index return. Table 6 presents the exposures to the risk factors. We find a mostly significant exposure to market risk, which is increasing as the rating decreases.
The exposure to volatility risk is negative and more so for lower ratings. It is significant at the 5% level for two out of seven indices. Finally, we find a negative exposure to liquidity risk that becomes monotonically more negative as the rating decreases, and is significant at the 5% level in four out of seven cases. These results are quite similar to the US results. The market and liquidity risk exposures are slightly smaller for high ratings and somewhat larger for lower ratings, which is line with the difference between expected returns for the US versus Europe. The main difference is that there is some evidence for volatility risk exposure for the European sample. The economic effect of volatility risk is however moderate: the average R of volatility risk we will not incorporate the volatility factor in our cross-sectional regressions. Table 7 reports the market and liquidity exposures for the model without volatility risk.
Next we turn to the results of the cross-sectional regression of expected returns on market and liquidity beta's. This analysis should be considered as explorative, since we have a rather short sample to estimate expected returns. We consider several levels for the equity premium.
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Not surprisingly, table 8 shows that the statistical significance of the liquidity risk premium estimate is relatively small. Still, the estimated liquidity premium is negative for all equity premium levels, in line with the results for the US.
Thus, European bond indices with high liquidity risk have high expected returns to compensate for this risk. Relative to the US, the estimated liquidity risk premium is somewhat smaller for Europe. Figure 9 gives a decomposition of the model-implied expected return, and shows that the liquidity risk premium is negligible for high-rated bonds, while it is considerable for speculative-grade bonds. For high-rated bonds the market beta is small, so that a significant part of the expected return on these bonds remains unexplained. For speculative-grade bonds a very significant part of the credit spread puzzle can be explained.
In sum, this section has shown that systematic shocks in equity market liquidity have a significant impact on European bond prices, even if we control for market and volatility risk. In addition, we have provided some first preliminary evidence for the existence of a liquidity risk premium in European corporate bond markets.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated liquidity risk as a determinant of expected returns on corporate bonds. The modeling approach is to treat liquidity as a risk factor, where the exposures of corporate bond returns to liquidity shocks are priced. We include two types of liquidity exposure, one to equity market liquidity and one to treasury bond market liquidity. First of all, we show that corporate bond returns have a significant exposure to the liquidity factors, even if we control for market and volatility risk. In addition, the liquidity factors contribute significantly to the expected return on corporate bonds. In terms of expected returns, the estimated liquidity premium is around 0.6% for long-maturity investment grade bonds, and around 1.5% for below investment grade bonds. Together with the market risk premium, the liquidity premium explains a significant part of the credit spread puzzle. Only for short-maturity high-rated bonds our model underestimates the expected excess returns. We validate our US results by studying a recent sample of European bond data. European bonds also appear to exhibit a credit spread puzzle. In line with the US results, we find that European corporate bonds have a significant exposure to liquidity shocks, which helps to explain the expected bond returns. Using swap rates instead of treasury rates to proxy for default-free rates, the graph shows the direct estimates of expected US bond returns (equation (3)), and model-implied values (equation (2)) calculated using regression IV in table 5. The liquidity premium is the sum of the premia on equity and government bond market liquidity. 
Observed premium
The graph shows the direct estimates of expected European bond returns (equation (3)), and model-implied values (equation (2)) calculated using regression I in table 8 at a 4% equity premium.
